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CRIMINAL LAW
I.
State v.
State v.
State v.
State v.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Aldridge, 304 S.E.2d 671 (W. Va. 1983).
Shingleton, 301 S.E.2d 625 (W. Va. 1983).
Hall, 298 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 1982).
Mays, 307 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va. 1983).

During the survey period the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
had the opportunity to further define the extent of the rights protected
under the fourth amendment. In spite of a continuing dilution of fourth
amendment rights by the United States Supreme Court, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has remained a staunch defender of those rights.
The court may decide to use the West Virginia Constitution in order to
safeguard these rights to a higher degree than required by the United States
Supreme Court.
In State v. Aldridge' the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held
that a police officer's request for a murder-by-stabbing suspect to remove his
gloves is not an unconstitutional search. The court determined that the intrusion was so minimal that it did not constitute a violation of the defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy.
Aldridge had been observed with friends at the victim's residence on the
day of the killing and was sought for questioning. Two state troopers stopped
Aldridge the next day on the street to ask him some questions. It was a
warm afternoon and the officers noted the defendant was wearing gloves.
Aldridge was asked to remove the gloves. He did, and the troopers saw a
laceration on his hand. The defendant was arrested several weeks later, after
another individual reported to police that Aldridge had displayed the wound
in public and admitted to killing the victim.
At trial, Aldridge claimed that the trooper's testimony concerning the injured hand was inadmissible. He asserted that he had been subjected to an
unconstitutional, nonconsensual search when he was required to remove his
gloves, thus violating his reasonable expectation of privacy under the fourth
amendment.2 On appeal, the supreme court followed the reasoning of State v.
Boswell' and concluded that the seizure was so minimal, that the traditional
probable cause rule was not applicable. This reasoning parallels a series of
United States Supreme Court decisions beginning with Terry v. Ohio.'
In Aldridge, the court recognized that the concern underlying most
' 304 S.E.2d 671 (W. Va. 1983).

2 Id. at 673.
3 294 S.E.2d 287, 295 (W. Va. 1982). The Boswell court held that a police officer walking over
to a defendant's parked van, tapping on the window, and asking for identification was not an illegal seizure.
1 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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search and seizure problems is the need to protect an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy. The court stated that the defendant "had, at most,
only a very limited reasonable privacy interest in keeping a glove on his cut
hand."' The defendant's argument was further weakened because he had
displayed his wound in public.' The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
7
cited the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Dionisio
which
held that the fourth amendment does not provide protection for what a person knowingly exposes to the public.
The court in Aldridge took a common sense approach in balancing the
tension between effective law enforcement and the need to protect fourth
amendment rights. Realizing the trivial invasion of Aldridge's privacy
(especially considering his prior public disclosures) and recognizing the need
to give police officers some flexibility in street encounters with suspects, the
court held the search constitutional.
The court in State v. Shingleton8 dealt with the question of whether the
warrantless search of an automobile that had been stopped for speeding
violated' defendant's fourth amendment rights.
In Shingleton the defendant was stopped by an Ohio state trooper for
speeding. At the time of the stop, the trooper noticed two rolls of coins in the
back seat of the car. Shingleton was charged with speeding and was required
to follow the trooper to the Washington County Sheriff's Office to post an appearance bond.
Shortly after Shingleton and the trooper entered the Sheriff's office, the
trooper heard a broadcast over a radio scanner stating that police should be
on the lookout for old coins taken in a recent robbery. The trooper asked
Shingleton about the rolls of coins in the car and Shingleton replied that they
were empty. The trooper questioned this fact and Shingleton became nervous
and his answers contradictory.' The car was then searched, and money bags
from a West Virginia bank were discovered. Shingleton was subsequently
convicted in West Virginia on a two-count indictment for breaking and entering and for grand larceny. 10 The trial court allowed the evidence discovered
during the search to be admitted, finding that a valid search under the
"automobile exception" was conducted.11
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the warrantless search of his

'Aldridge, 304 S.E.2d at 674.
O

Id. at 672.

O

410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973).
301 S.E.2d 625 (W. Va. 1983).
Id. at 626.

10Id.

11Id. at 625.
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automobile was unconstitutional. The court had little trouble finding that the
automobile was legitimately stopped.12 The court then focused its inquiry on
the exigent circumstances requirement of the automobile exception. It concluded that probable cause was established to search the vehicle because of
the trooper's observation of the coin rolls, Shingleton's suspicious behavior,
and Shingleton's contradictory statements.13 Focusing on the mobility of the
car and the time required to obtain a warrant, the court found that exigent
circumstances were sufficient to justify the warrantless search." With the
legal arrest, probable cause and exigent circumstances requisites met, the
court concluded that the warrantless search was constitutional. 5
The decision in Shingleton simply reaffirms the court's adherence to the
well-settled rule that some searches of automobiles may be conducted
without search warrants because of the auto's mobility and the diminished
expectation of privacy. Shingleton is consistent with the court's prior
holdings,"6 and with the guidelines of the United States Supreme Court in
this area. 7
Two areas of fourth amendment law were analyzed in State v. Hall:8
(1) probable cause as it relates to information obtained from unnamed informants and, (2) the required specificity of the description of property to be
seized. The Hall court condoned the use of unnamed informants (with certain
restrictions) and found the specificity of the description of items to be seized
sufficient.
The defendant, Earl Hall, was convicted of fifteen counts (eleven felonies
and four misdemeanors) of buying, receiving and aiding in the concealment of
stolen property. At trial, he sought to suppress the items seized by the police
pursuant to two search warrants. Hall argued that the first search warrant
was unconstitutional because there was not probable cause to indicate
criminal activity and because the descriptions of the items to be seized were
overbroad. He further argued that since the first search warrant was invalid

The guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures recognizes a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house for which a search warrant
may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, row boat, wagon or automobile for contraband goods where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
1

J. KLOTTER & J. KANOVITCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR POLICE § 4.10 at 150 (1971).

"3Shingleton, 301 S.E.2d at 627.
14 Id.

Id.
l' See State v. Moore, 272 S.E.2d 804 (W. Va. 1980) (holding that once a vehicle is stopped for
some legitimate state interest probable cause may arise or exigent circumstances may be present
which justify a warrantless search).
, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1965).
1' 298 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 1982).
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the second warrant was also invalid because it was issued to seize property
observed during a previous illegal search.
Initially, the court examined the circumstances giving rise to the
issuance of the first warrant.19 Hall asserted that the reliance on an unnamed informant to establish probable cause was improper under State v.
Stone."° In Stone the trooper obtaining the search warrant gave no facts concerning his informant's reliability and the informant had not personally viewed the property.2 Stone required that the facts which support reliability and
the existence of criminal activities must be set forth before a magistrate,
prior to the issuance of a warrant. In Hall, the court concluded that the facts
had been properly set forth by the police officer to the magistrate, and
therefore, the Stone deficiencies were not present.' Construing Stone and
Hall together, it can be fairly implied that the information underlying the informant's reliability and the existence of the enterprise must be expressed to
the magistrate under the oath but does not have to appear in the affidavit for
the warrant.
The defendant also contended that the search warrant description of
items to be seized was insufficient. The court rejected this argument, relying
on the Kansas case of State v. Walker,' where a description of items similar
in specificity was held to be constitutional. The court reasoned that there
could be no confusion under the terms of the search warrant as to what was
to be confiscated.24
The court has again upheld the use of unnamed informants in procuring
search warrants. The Hall decision further clarifies the necessary procedures
to be followed when unnamed informants are used, in order to safeguard
fourth amendment rights. The court's common sense approach to the
specificity required in search warrants imposes a reasonable restriction on
19A West Virginia State Policeman received information from a confidential informant that a
large quantity of tools, construction equipment, clearance lights marked Alfab, Inc., and one to
two thousand pens with Gilmer Fuel Company printed on them were lying on and around a certain farm. By checking with various police departments, the policeman confirmed that the pens
and lights had been stolen.
A warrant was obtained from a magistrate. The warrant listed which items were to be
seized, i.e., "hand tools, power tools, clearance lights contained in a cardboard box with the name
Alfab, Inc., Smithville, West Virginia, pens inscribed with the name of Gilmer Fuel Company inscribed thereon .... He informed the magistrate that he had confirmed they were stolen and he
added that his informant had viewed them personally. Hall, 298 S.E.2d at 249.
268 S.E.2d 50 (W. Va. 1980).
2! Id. at 53.

Hall, 298 S.E.2d at 251.
= 202 Kan. 475, 449 P.2d 515 (1969). See State ex rel. White v. Melton, 273 S.E.2d 81 (1980)
(holding that the search warrant or a sworn complaint expressly made a part of the warrant must
specifically describe the property to be seized).
2 Hall, 298 S.E.2d at 252.
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law enforcement. The court demands that the description be clear enough to
avoid confusion. However, that standard does not require overly-detailed
descriptions which would amount to an unnecessary or insurmountable
burden for police.
The application of Hall to future unnamed informant cases is uncertain in
view of the very recent United States Supreme Court decision in Illinois v.
Gates.' The Gates decision of 1983 relaxed the requirments of the exclusionary rule in informant cases.
In Gates, the police were tipped off to a drug ring by an anonymous letter. The Supreme Court relaxed its prior "two-pronged test" for the use of
unnamed informants which required: (1) that the informant's basis of
knowledge be revealed, and (2) that sufficient facts be presented to establish
either the informant's "veracity" or his "reliability."28 The Court in Gates
adopted the much more lenient "totality of the circumstances" test. Applying that test, the anonymous letter passed muster, and the evidence seized
was not excluded.
Whether the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals will follow the
Gates decision remains questionable. The court has in the past used the West
Virginia Constitution in order to adopt stronger procedural protections than
those of the United States Supreme Court.' Although the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has not expressly, as yet, used the West Virginia
Constitution in that context with regard to fourth amendment rights, the
court has alluded to this possibility in footnote 2 of State v. Canby. 9
In State v. Mays" the court held that a voluntary confession obtained
pursuant to an illegal arrest was inadmissible even though the defendant's
fifth amendment rights had been adequately protected by Miranda warnings
and regardless of the police officer's possible "good faith" reason for prolonging the interrogation.
Defendant voluntarily confessed to a murder during a nine hour seizure."
103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
28

Id.

at 2327-28.

Id. at 2328.
See State v. Rissler, 270 S.E.2d 778, 781-84 (W. Va. 1980).
2 252 S.E.2d 164, 167 n.2 (W. Va. 1979). The footnote reads in part: "[W]e are free to adopt
stronger protections under our State Constitution than those afforded by its federal counterpart."
307 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va. 1983).
, The appellant had become a suspect in a recent murder. The police seized Mays without a
warrant because they were afraid he might slip into Ohio. Although not formally arrested, Mays
was given Miranda warnings a~d agreed to discuss the murder with the police. Mays was taken to
the police station for interrogation. One hour and twenty minutes after his seizure the police obtained a warrant, but did not serve the warrant on Mays because they believed probable cause for
arrest was slipping away.
The police continued the interrogation another hour and twenty minutes without serving the
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The Mays court reasoned that since defendant was never told he was free to
go he was under de facto arrest.2 The prompt presentment statute 3 requires
that an individual under arrest must be presented to a magistrate without
unnecessary delay. The court, following the rationale of two 1982 cases, State
34 and State v. Mitter,
35 applied a strict application of the prompt
v. Persinger
presentment statute and found the nine hour delay violative of the statute.
Once the court found that there had been an illegal arrest, it applied State v.
Stanley36 which held that a confession obtained by exploitation of an illegal
arrest was inadmissable despite the fact that defendant's fifth amendment
rights had been protected by Miranda warnings.
The State argued that the extended interrogation was conducted in good
faith with the purpose of allowing the suspect to prove his innocence. The
court rejected this argument and reasoned that at the appellate level it is difficult to make distinctions based upon the subjective reason for the seizure. 7
Therefore, the court stated,
By establishing a clear rule that police investigatory interrogations
without presentment to a magistrate are allowable only when the
suspect is expressly informed that he is not under arrest, is not
obligated to answer any questions and is free to go, we hope to
establish a system sufficiently flexible that the innocent are allowed
to prove their blamelessness and the police are able effectively and
legally to interrogate those who are ultimately proven guilty.33
The decision in Mays demonstrates the court's heightened level of commitment to fourth amendment rights. By making the strong, fast rule that a
suspect under arrest must be presented to a magistrate without unnecessary
warrant. The defendant then requested a polygraph. The polygraph operator arrived after one
hour and thirty minutes. Again proper Miranda warnings were given along with a proper waiver
form. Another fifty minutes passed and now, five hours after his seizure (and before the polygraph
test was administered), defendant orally confessed to the killing. A stenographer arrived two
hours and twenty minutes after his oral confession and Mays signed the transcripts confession to
the crime. Nine hours after the original seizure Mays was presented to the magistrate and the
warrant was served upon him. During this nine hour seizure, Mays was never told he was free to
go.
Mays, 307 S.E.2d at 656-57.
1 Id. at 658.
I W. VA. CODE § 62-1-5 (1977). The statute reads in part:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint, or any person
making an arrest without a warrant for an offense committed in his presence, shall take
the arrested person without unnecessary delay before a [magistrate] of the county in
which the arrest is made.
1 286 S.E.2d 261 (W. Va. 1982).
z 289 S.E.2d 457 (W. Va. 1982).
284 S.E.2d 367 (W. Va. 1981).
Mays, 307 S.E.2d at 658.
SId.
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delay, regardless of the possible good intentions of the interrogator, the
court minimizes possibilities of future confusion in this area. This holding
should help protect citizens from future lengthy, illegal interrogations. On
the other hand, it is doubtful that this ruling will hinder future interrogations
of nonarrested suspects because all the police have to tell the suspect is that,
"he/she is free to go and does not have to answer any questions."
II.

SPEEDY TRIALS

State v. Foddrell, 297 S.E.2d 829 (W. Va. 1982).
The issue analyzed by the court in State v. Foddrell" was whether defendant had been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The defendant
was indicted for robbery in 1973, several months after the crime occurred. He
was arrested in Detroit in 1978, and stood trial in West Virginia in 1979.
Following his conviction, the defendant appealed to the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals. The court affirmed his conviction, but remanded
to the trial court to ascertain if the defendant was deprived of his right to a
speedy trial by this six year lapse."
The sole issue in Foddrell was whether the State used due diligence in
seeking the defendant. Foddrell introduced evidence that he lived openly in
Detroit during the five years after his indictment and could easily have been
found." Conversely, the State introduced evidence to show that it had taken
reasonable steps to locate and arrest the defendant. 2 The court applied the
test adopted in State v. Cox4" to determine whether the defendant had been
denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial." In Cox the court adopted
the four-factor balancing test promulgated by the United States Supreme
Court in Barker v. Wingo." The factors to be weighed under the test are:
(1) length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion
of his rights and (4) prejudice to the defendant."
297 S.E.2d 829 (W.'Va. 1982).
The court reasoned that a delay of almost six years between indictment and trial clearly
warrants further inquiry. Id. at 832.
4' Defendant claimed that he used his correct name and address in the Detroit telephone
directory to apply for and receive a Michigan driver's license and to file yearly city, state, and
federal taxes. Id. at 831.
, The police interviewed numerous persons in McDowell County following the robbery in an
attempt to discover the appellant's whereabouts. The investigator reports that he was in Martinsville, Virginia and notified other police departments that the appellant was a fugitive through
NCIC computer and contact with the FBI. A capias was issued. The prosecuting authorities
responded immediately to the 1975 report that the appellant was in New York, indicating their intent to seek extradition, and acted without delay to obtain custody of the appellant upon being
notified of his arrest in Detroit in 1978. Id. at 832.
253 S.E.2d 517 (W. Va. 1979).
4 297 S.E.2d at 832.
41 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
" Foddrell,297 S.E.2d at 830 (quoting State v. Cox, 253 S.E.2d 517 (W. Va. 1979)).
40
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Applying this test in Foddrell, the court found that the State had acted
with due diligence to secure custody of the appellant for trial.4 7 However, the
court also stressed the facts that the appellant knew the police were looking
for him but did not contact them, appellant did not present documentary
evidence supporting his claims of "open" living in Detroit, and appellant
failed to show he was prejudiced by the delay.48
The Foddrell decision does not reveal how much weight "deficiencies"
such as those appearing in this case carry in the balancing process.
Therefore, there are no "black and white" parameters to define the minimum
standard that a police department must meet in its search for indictees. It
should be assumed the court will continue to review the facts of each case individually in order to determine if the defendant was afforded his right to a
speedy trial.
III.

CONTEMPT

In re Yoho, 301 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1983).
In In re Yoho49 the court held that an unjustified refusal to testify before
a grand jury after receiving immunity constituted direct civil contempt and
that a summary disposition of the matter did not violate defendant's due process rights.
Defendant, Robert Yoho, was indicted for two drug violations. The state
offered to nolle both charges if he would testify as to his drug sources. Yoho
refused to testify because he feared retaliation. Yoho was subpoenaed to
testify before the Wetzel County Grand Jury and was granted immunity. He
reiterated his refusal to testify for fear of harm to himself and his family.
Yoho was warned that he was in contempt of court and could be incarcerated.
Yoho acknowledged this, but maintained his refusal to testify. The court
sentenced him to confinement in the Wetzel County Jail until he testified. A
stay was granted pending this appeal.
The threshold question of whether fear of retaliation is justification for
refusal was disposed of by the court by citing Piemonte v. United States"
and numerous circuit court decisions." It is a well-settled principle that fear
of harm cannot justify a refusal to testify before a grand jury. This principle
is grounded in the notion that if such refusals to testify were permitted then
criminals would be encouraged to silence potential witnesses with threats
and violence, thereby undermining the search for truth.2
7

Foddrell, 297 S.E.2d at 832.

7

48

Id.

" 301 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1983).
367 U.S. 556 (1961).
5, In re Yoho, 301 S.E.2d at 583.
Id.
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The primary issue decided by the Yoho court was whether the trial court
had correctly labeled Yoho's refusal to testify a direct contempt. This
classification is important because if it is classified a direct civil contempt
then the West Virginia Code provides for a summary disposition." If the
refusal to testify is merely an indirect criminal contempt then the Code sets
strict limits as to the application of summary disposition."
The question of direct versus indirect contempt arises because Yoho's
refusal to testify was made to a grand jury rather than in the presence of the
court. The United States Supreme Court in Harris v. United States" and
other jurisdictions have held that grand jury witnesses' refusal to testify are
indirect contempts and that summary disposition is erroneous. However, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that Yoho's refusal to testify
before the grand jury was a direct contempt and cited numerous other
jurisdictions which concur."
The court next ascertained whether this was a civil or criminal contempt.
The court focused upon the purpose of the sanction. Since Yoho was incarcerated for an indefinite amount of time (until he purged himself) and the
purpose of the sanction was coercive in nature, the court found that the trial
court had correctly labelled this as a civil contempt.57
Defendant claimed that a summary disposition deprived him of his due
W. VA. CODE § 57-5-6 (1966) states in its entirety:
If a person, after being served with such summons, shall attend and yet refuse to
be sworn, or to give evidence, or to produce any writing or document required, he may
by order of the court whose clerk issued said summons, or of the person before whom he
was summoned to attend, be committed to jail, there to remain until he shall, in custody
of the jailer, give such evidence or produce such writing or document.
W. VA. CODE § 61-5-26 (1977) states in its entirety:
The courts and the judges thereof may issue attachment for contempt and punish
them summarily only in the following cases: (a) Misbehavior in the presence of the
court, or so near thereto as to obstruct or interrupt the administration of justice;
(b) violence or threats of violence to a judge or officer of the court, or to a juror,
witness, or party going to, attending or returning from the court, for or in respect of
any act or proceeding had, or to be had, in such court; (c) misbehavior of an officer of the
court, in his official character; (d) disobedience to or resistance of any officer of the
court, juror, witness, or other person, to any lawful process, judgment, decree or order
of the said court. No court shall, without a jury, for any such contempt as is mentioned
in subdivision (a) of this section, impose a fine exceeding fifty dollars, or imprison more
than ten days. But in any such case the court may impanel a jury (without an indictment
or any formal pleading) to ascertain the fine or imprisonment proper to be inflicted, and
may give judgment according to the verdict. No court shall impose a fine for contempt,
unless the defendant be present in court, or shall have been served with a rule of the
court to show cause, on some certain day, and shall have failed to appear and show
cause.
382 U.S. 162 (1965).
' In re Yoho, 301 S.E.2d at 584. See generally Annot., 69 A.L.R. 3d 501 (1976).
" In re Yoho, 301 S.E.2d at 584.
3
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process rights. The court cited Chesapeake & Ohio System Federation,
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Hash,59 which reemphasized that the basic procedural safeguards of due process rights are notice and
the opportunity to be heard. The court found that Yoho had notice since he
was warned both before and after his refusal to testify that his actions were
contemptuous. Yoho was present with his counsel and had ample opportunity
to be heard. Therefore, the court found that Yoho's due process rights were
adequately protected."
The court in Yoho has given the grand jury a useful tool to compel
witnesses to testify. This tool, however, is not to be used contrary to a person's due process rights. The Yoho ruling is further tempered by the court's
emphasis that: (1) a civil contempt sanction is inappropriate where a defendant has no ability to purge himself; (2) the civil contempt sanction must
cease when defendant does purge himself; and (3) a civil contempt sanction
must cease at the end of the grand jury's term. 1
John M. Lynn

" Id. at 585-86. Cf. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 n.9 (1966) (recommending
that civil sanctions to coerce testimony, if feasible, be attempted prior to resort to criminal
penalties).
' 294 S.E.2d 96, 101 (W. Va. 1982).
In re Yoho, 301 S.E.2d at 587.
01 Id.
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